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Abstract
Colombian guerrilla movements have increasingly been associated with illicit
activity and terror. This paper is divided into two main sections. The first
section traces the roots of the FARC, ELN and EPL guerrilla movements
and describes how traditional Marxist-style guerrilla groups became more
associated with crime and kidnapping than political ideals. The second turns
to the economics literature to explain the observed guerrilla behavior relating
it to traditional guerrilla movements, organized crime and extortion.
Resumen
Los movimientos guerrilleros Colombianos son cada vez mÆs asociados
con actividad il￿cita y terrorismo. El presente trabajo se divide en dos
secciones principales. La primera secci￿n indaga acerca de las ra￿ces de
los movimientos de las FARC, ELN y EPL y describe como movimientos
guerrilleros del estilo Marxista fueron mÆs asociados con crimen y secuestro
que ideales pol￿ ticas. La segunda parte enfoca en la literatura de econom￿a
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para explicar el comportamiento guerrillero observado relacionando con
los movimientos guerrilleros tradicionales, crimen organizado y extorci￿n.
JEL classification: N4, K42, O1
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Introduction
The Colombian government presently faces the challenge of establishing
control over the violent guerrilla movements which support themselves
through revenue from illicit activity. The two main guerrilla groups, the FARC
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and the ELN (EjØrcito
de Liberaci￿n Nacional), are known to carry out kidnappings, cultivate
and process illicit drugs, and extort companies and individuals throughout
the country. The guerrilla movements￿ participation in illegal revenue raising
activities and their resistance to political dialogue has brought into question
the motivation for the existence of these organizations.
The historical review describes in broad terms the events and circumstances
which may have led previously traditional guerrilla-style insurgency
movements to become recognized for involvement in illicit revenue raising
activities. The events and conditions which resulted in the formation of the
guerrilla movements in Colombia are outlined in Section A. Section B. and
Section C follow the evolution of the movements chronologically. It is
found that the behavior of the movements since the mid-1980s has in-
creasingly raised doubts about the ideological and political nature of
these groups.
Upon putting into question the stated and presumed objectives of the guerrilla
movements and characterizing the groups by their observed behavior,
alternative nomenclature for the groups may be proposed. Section II. dis-
cusses previous articles relevant to the problem of the guerrilla movements,
and considers in particular definitions for organized crime groups or criminal
gangs. Definitions offered by various authors suggest that the activities of
the guerrilla groups resemble those of a criminal organization rather than an
ideologically driven movement.
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I. Historical review
A. Guerrilla formation
Although no guerrilla movement in Colombia has existed as an organized
movement for 50 years, the roots of contemporary guerrilla groups can be
traced to the period known as la violencia (1948-1957). La violencia
begins with the assassination of the important Liberal Party leader Jorge EliØcer
GaitÆn on April 9, 1948 and concludes with the signing of the National Front
(Frente Nacional) agreement in late 1957. GaitÆn￿s death marks an escala-
tion in the fighting between the members of Colombia￿s two traditional politi-
cal organizations, the Liberal and Conservative Parties2. The conflict, which
resulted in the death of approximately 200,000 people, has alternatively been
described as partisan political rivalry and rural banditry, with partisan rivalry
being the single most important cause of the violencia3.
In 1946, the Conservative candidate Mariano Ospina PØrez (1946-1950)
won the presidency after 16 years of Liberal control, and tensions between
the two parties increased with the installation of the new Conservative lead-
ership. As Conservative mayors replaced Liberals in local governments,
fighting broke out in several departments along party lines. Conservatives
were eager to take control of local budgets, while Liberals were some-
times reluctant to relinquish power. The 1948 assassination of GaitÆn, a
charismatic Liberal leader and presidential hopeful, intensified the conflict.
Some members of the Liberal party accused the Conservatives of carrying
out the assassination, thereby justifying retribution. With the Liberal party
politically wounded after the death of their leader, the Conservatives again
won control of the presidency and Laureano G￿mez took power in 1950.
G￿mez￿s victory and continued Conservative control contributed to the
formation of Liberal ￿guerrilla squads￿ (Maullin 1973) in rural areas which
were organized to retaliate against Conservative farms and villages.
G￿mez￿s leadership ended in 1953 before the conclusion of his presiden-
tial term due to a loss of support among moderate Conservatives and the
2 Maullin (1973) describes the historical ideological division of the groups as anti-clerical
rationalists (Liberals) and pro-clerical defenders of church prerogatives (Conservatives).
3 See Hanratty and Meditz, eds (1990) and Bushnell (1993)for discussions of the preexisting
political conflicts and a detailed account of la violencia.
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military establishment, stemming from his inability to effectively control the
escalating conflict. The leader of the coup d￿etat which ousted G￿mez,
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, assumed the presidency and remained in
power until May 1957. It was opposition to Rojas Pinilla and his repres-
sive regime that united the Liberals and Conservatives in the mid-1950s
and allowed them to reach the National Front agreement.
During the period between 1950 and 1958, irregular violence was
increasingly organized and attributed to self-defense militias and bandit-
like groups. Although these groups formed primarily as a result of partisan
disputes, they also fought because of family vendettas, local disagreements
over land and water rights, and control of coffee crops (whose value
increased dramatically in the mid-1950s). In addition, some groups
organized with an alternative political agenda. They promoted rural land
reforms and better wages. The government￿s repeal of pro-labor laws passed
in the 1930s, the official opposition to independent labor unions and
Communist leaning organizations, and the increasingly arbitrary policies of
the Rojas Pinilla regime fueled the strengthening of these organizations.
According to Bagley (1988), the circumstances led to the formation of groups
he identifies as ￿revolutionary guerrillas￿ in the Colombian countryside.
The fighting between Liberals and Conservatives, the Rojas Pinilla leadership,
and the period known as la violencia came to a close in 1958 with the
implementation of the National Front agreement. In this arrangement, the
Liberals and Conservatives agreed to alternate control of the presidency
until 1974, with the first president elected under the agreement Liberal
Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962). The principal goal of the
reconciliation between the two parties and the establishment of the National
Front agreement was to reduce the violencia.
Given that both parties recognized that an underlying element of the violencia
was rural discontent, Lleras Camargo launched an agrarian reform program
and a community action program in 1958. The objective of the agrarian reform
was to redistribute land to the small-holder peasants. Community development
projects encouraged local development in the rural countryside and the strength-
ening of the influence of the central government in BogotÆ. The effort was
coordinated through the Community Action (Acci￿n Comunal) program which
formed pro-government organizations at both urban and rural neighborhood
levels. The program offered public funding for the construction of schools, health
clinics, water and sewage systems, roads and community centers.
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Despite the efforts of the National Front agreement and Community Action
program to address the needs of the urban and rural poor in the late-1950s
and early-1960s, corruption, limited availability of funds and the slow pace
of land reform produced frustration among the groups the programs intended
to aid. Furthermore, the government continued to face problems of
unemployment, and lack of low income housing and basic services in urban
areas. The government￿s struggle to address legitimate concerns of rural
(and urban) poor while maintaining a strict two-party Liberal/Conservative
political framework allowed groups with alternative political ideologies to
synthesize into guerrilla-style movements.
In the post-1958 period, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
Colombianas (Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia or FARC), pres-
ently the strongest guerrilla movement in Colombia, developed out of some
of the previously formed and loosely organized guerrilla groups or ￿revolu-
tionary guerrillas￿ and organized bandits that had remained active during
the National Front agreement. Although these small pockets of organized
rural resistance existed in the 1950s, and prior association with the Colom-
bian Communist Party (CCP) has been suggested, the formal formation of
the FARC begins with the appearance of the Southern Guerrilla Bloc in
1964 across several departamentos (administrative departments or prov-
inces). Furthermore, the organization of the Southern Guerrilla Bloc
concretized the link between the guerrilla/bandit groups and the CCP. The
CCP provided financial support and political orientation to the Southern
Guerrilla Bloc, while actions in the field were carried out through the pre-
existing guerrilla/bandit infrastructure. Maullin (1973) points out that in ad-
dition to seeking support of guerrilla/bandit groups, the CCP sought to
organize and recruit disaffected members of the Liberal party. In mid-1966,
the Southern Guerrilla Bloc officially transformed itself into the FARC with
a declaration issued from Moscow claiming that the imperialist United States
had set up military bases in Colombia and calling Colombian workers and
peasants to support the just struggle of the guerrillas (Bagley 1988)4.
4 Further demonstrating the link between the Soviet Union and the formation of the FARC
is the 1966 book titled Colombia: An Embattled Land (Anonymous 1966) published by
Peace and Socialism Publishers in Prague, 1966. The introduction establishes the anti-
Conservative nature of the CCP by declaring the 1946 Conservative electoral victory as
the seizure of power by ￿the ultra-reactionaries.￿ The book also describes the revolution-
ary struggle faced by peasants of Colombia and their now famous leader Manuel ￿Tirofijo￿
(￿Sure shot￿) Marulanda.
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Between 1962 and the official formation of the FARC, there is evidence of
stronger ties between the CCP and the groups which eventually formed the
FARC. The political violence appears to have experienced two important
changes: it became more organized and oriented toward specific military
and political goals. The changes reflected (1) the effort by the CCP to
become the tutor, coordinator, and patron of the guerrilla￿s activities and
(2) a decision by the Colombian government to alter its traditional view of
the causes of political violence (the struggle between Liberals and Conservatives)
and adopt a new military strategy to deal with it (Bagley 1988).
The goal of the CCP between 1962 and the 1964 formation of the South-
ern Guerrilla Bloc was to co-opt several of the existing non-Communist
armed groups. Bagley (1988) points out that on the one hand, guerrilla
violence was acknowledged by both Communists and non-Communists
alike to be associated with locally felt Conservative and Liberal vendettas
and with common banditry5. On the other hand, the pervasive belief that
socioeconomic problems in Colombia would lead to revolutionary vio-
lence made the guerrillas and bandits symptomatic of the impending revolu-
tion6. By integrating armed groups that could potentially cause a revolution in
Colombia, as had happened several years earlier in Cuba, the CCP paved the
road for the formation of the FARC as an arm of a Soviet-line Communist party.
Two other guerrilla movements whose roots can be traced to the period of
the violencia and early years of the National Front agreement are the EjØrcito
de Liberaci￿n Nacional (National Liberation Army or ELN) and EjØrcito
Popular de Liberaci￿n (Popular Liberation Army or EPL). As with the
FARC, both the ELN and the EPL movements drew their recruits from ban-
dits or guerrilla groups that organized during the period of the violencia.
While the FARC tended to be more organized in the southern departamentos,
the ELN was active in the north-eastern areas of Colombia and the EPL was
active in areas slightly north of the FARC7.
5 Bandits are described as ￿highwaymen￿ who assault peasant￿s homes and inter-city
buses, small groups with a less organized character, while guerrillas are considered to be
more organized and carry out ordered or premeditated actions (Bagley 1988).
6 Bagley, p. 30.
7 The FARC formed from groups in Caldas, Cauca, Cundinamarca, Huila, Quindi￿, Tolima, and
Valle del Cauca departamentos, the ELN from groups in Santander, Antioquia and Bol￿var, and
the EPL, the smallest of the three, formed groups in Antioquia and C￿rdoba (Figure 1).
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The ELN arose out of a combination of groups involved in the violencia
and politically disenchanted students and recent college graduates in the
Santander Department who favored a Cuban-style revolution in Colombia.
Formed in 1963-64, the Cuban orientation of the ELN contrasts with the
FARC, influenced by Soviet politics via the CCP. Cuba provided money
and supplies that helped to form the ELN and offered ideological orientation.
The leaders of the ELN claimed to use violence to achieve political
objectives, and those objectives, although forwarded by educated university
graduates, were to improve conditions of rural peasants and fight against
the oppressive system which perpetuated their misery. The educated
leadership found that instead of attracting peasants to the military struggle,
it drew armed recruits that came from the same pool of bandit groups
which formed the FARC (Bagley 1988).
The EPL was organized slightly later than the FARC and the ELN, and
operated in a smaller geographical region. It is possible that the EPL was
formed by a group of Maoist-oriented dissidents who broke away from
the CCP prior to the formation of the FARC. Whether or not this is true, it
seems that the EPL grew out of the same bandit/guerrilla groups that formed
the other guerrilla movements in the mid-1960s. As with the other groups,
the claimed objectives of the armed struggle were to combat banditry and
improve poor agricultural working conditions and wages.
B. Late 1960s and 1970s
After the formation of the three main guerrilla groups, the FARC, ELN,
and EPL, they faced changes in domestic and international conditions which
weakened the movements. International support for the movements declined,
the military began to carry out more effective counter-insurgency measures,
government programs to improve rural conditions drew support away from
the movements, and investments in the agricultural sector altered the structure
of the rural areas. By the mid to late-1970s, the guerrilla movements had
lost the political momentum which led to their formation in the early-1960s.
Since it was known that a link between the CCP and the FARC existed
and that the Soviet Union offered organizational and financial support to
the FARC via the CCP, president Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970)
addressed the problem by opening diplomatic discussions with the Soviet
Union. His objective seems to have been to open formal ties and decrease
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financial assistance to the FARC. In January 1968, the Colombian govern-
ment established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and shortly
afterward the activities of the FARC declined.
The military also implemented formal counter-insurgency plans as a reaction
to the establishment of the guerrilla movements in the early-1960s. Plan Laso,
a central part of the strategy and the main anti-guerrilla program started in
1962, restructured the military￿s training and operations and placed greater
emphasis on counter-guerrilla measures. As a result, the military also stepped
up efforts aimed at directly fighting the FARC, ELN and EPL once they had
become formally established movements with external ties. The second aspect
of Plan Laso was community development which advocated the use of military
resources in public works and social programs, with the objective of improving
conditions for poor rural and urban residents and diminishing the the pool of
potential guerrilla recruits or sympathizers. The military￿s two-pronged approach
against the guerrilla movements, armed and community oriented response,
effectively reduced the activity to the three main guerrilla organizations, the
FARC, ELN, and EPL, between the late-1960s and early-1970s.
An additional component of the military￿s campaign against the guerrilla groups
was growth of the armed forces. Table 1 indicates that between 1960 and
1969 the size of the Colombian armed forces (army, navy and air force)
approximately tripled. The larger number of recruits certainly contributed to
the greater success of anti-guerrilla measures taken in the late-1960s and
early-1970s. Table 1 also shows that greater military spending accompanied
the larger sized force. Defense spending nearly doubled in the same period.
The rural agricultural sector received assistance and revitalization under the
presidency of Liberal Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) who furthered agrar-
ian reform. The reform implemented by Lleras Restrepo intended to address
socioeconomic concerns in the rural areas. His agrarian reform policy was
designed to accelerate the modernization and commercialization of agriculture
and implement a redistributive land reform program. Although land reform may
not have been as effective as Lleras Restrepo desired, it did have the effect of
changing the structure of agriculture, which in turn increased production in the
agricultural sector and altered the structure of the rural population.
The growth in agriculture between 1965 and 1975, shown in Table 2, re-
flects the impact of the Lleras Restrepo reforms and larger government
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expenditures on agriculture during the presidency of Conservative Misael
Pastrana (1970-1974). During this eleven year period, the contribution of
labor to agricultural output drops and the stock of physical capital increases
significantly, indicating the efforts to mechanize the agricultural sector. A
consequence of this policy was to reduce the share of workers in the
agricultural sector. The agricultural reforms altered the structure of the rural
peasant base, seemingly affecting the groups from which the guerrilla
movements hoped to gain support and recruit new members.
The change in the structure of the rural agricultural sector was accompanied
by increasing urban migration. Table 3 demonstrates the dramatic shift in
the balance between urban and rural populations from the 1950s to the
1970s. In 1951, less than 40% of the population lived in the urban centers,
and by 1973 this number had reached nearly 60%8. The transformation of
the rural sector as a result of urban migration is another factor which affected
the traditional recruiting pool of the guerrilla movements.
By the mid-1970s, with the stronger counter-guerrilla efforts of the military
and the implementation of government programs designed to address the
socioeconomic factors which may have contributed to the formation of the
guerrilla groups in the mid-1960s, it appeared that the government had
eliminated the guerrilla movements. Hanratty and Meditz, eds (1990) state
that by the early 1970s the FARC appeared incapable of mounting sustained
operations, the armed forces declared that the ELN was ￿virtually
destroyed,￿ and operational capabilities of the EPL were weakened by
deaths of key leaders and internal dissension. The military effort may have
had the strongest impact on the ELN. It resulted in the death of two of the
three leaders of the movement, and the capture of the principal ideologue
(Loveman and Davies, Jr., eds 1997).
C. End of the 1970s and present
The mid-1970s mark a general decline in the political activity of the guer-
rilla groups and the period in which the movements began to participate in
8 The urban migration between 1951 and 1964 demonstrates also the effects of the violencia
on the rural population.
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the illicit drug industry. Factors which may have contributed to the political
inactivity of the guerrilla movements include those previously outlined,
stronger military counter-insurgency operations in the late-1960s and early-
1970s, the loss of leadership and internal dissent within the movements, the
government￿s implementation of agriculture reform programs, urban
migration, and decreased international support for guerrilla movements.
Also, the end of the National Front agreement in 1974 ended the political
context under which the guerrilla groups formed. The presidency no longer
alternated between the Conservative and Liberal parties, but it depended
solely on the outcome at the ballot box.
At the same time that the guerrilla movements appeared to be losing politi-
cal and financial support, illicit drug production in Colombia began to ex-
pand. The weakened guerrilla movements and the nascent drug cartels
turned to each other to form a mutually beneficial relationship. The isolated
areas which remained under the control of the guerrillas offered the drug
producers a set of rural enclaves where the illicit industry could develop
with less fear of military or government intervention (Pecaut 1997). The
guerrillas, particularly the FARC during this period, gave protection to mari-
juana fields, and later coca fields, cocaine processing laboratories, and points
of export in exchange for a share of the profits, arms, and logistical support.
The alliance that formed between the drug traffickers and the guerrilla
movements during the mid-1970s may indicate the beginning of the
transformation of the movements into their current manifestations. As the
drug industry grew, the association between drug traffickers and the guerrillas
grew stronger. Given the aforementioned structural changes, the guerrilla
groups appeared less connected the political problems of the time and
more concerned with illicit enterprises.
Although the guerrilla groups continued to define themselves as politically
motivated, Casas￿s (1980) narrative of the situation surrounding the Septem-
ber, 1977 Paro Nacional (National Strike) demonstrates that discontent
which may have existed within certain sectors of the population was not
channeled through the guerrilla movements nor did the movements serve as
the voice for these individuals. Furthermore, it seems the guerrilla groups had
not developed the political infrastructure to usurp power. Casas (1980) states,
￿If there had been an Organization or a Revolutionary Political Alliance with
the capacity to carry out an effective overthrow of the government, this strike
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could have become an opportune occasion for it9￿. The inability of the guer-
rilla groups to capitalize on the popular mood which led to the strike and the
existence of a strike during a time when the guerrilla movements were weak-
est emphasizes the discrepancy between the guerrilla movements￿ ideologi-
cal rhetoric and their political nature. The movements continued to proclaim
themselves the voice of the politically disenchanted, but had increasingly be-
come fringe groups supporting themselves through illegal activity.
The guerrilla groups￿ general lack of political initiative was evidenced again
in the early-1980s with the failure of the peace process initiated during
Belisario Betancur￿s presidency (1982-1986). President Betancur￿s
government organized comprehensive peace talks with several guerrilla
movements in order to address their proclaimed concerns and integrate the
groups into the political process. It was an opportunity which was designed
to favor the guerrilla movements and encourage them to participate in the
political process. Mendoza (1996) explains that the movements, the FARC
in particular, recognized peace as a threat to the ￿legitimate￿ continuation
of their struggle, and that the behavior of the groups demonstrated a lack of
knowledge of the political environment and a lack of political experience in
order to participate productively in the talks.
More specifically, the reaction to the proposed peace process varied slightly
with each of the guerrilla movements. Ram￿rez and Restrepo (1998) detail
the behavior of the participants. The ELN categorically refused to participate,
claiming that they would not be tricked into an amnesty or a cease fire
agreement. The EPL initially appeared receptive to the peace process and
proposed realistic goals, but eventual conflicts between the EPL and the
government caused the negotiations to fail. The FARC entered the
negotiation process without ever abandoning their efforts to create a
￿popular army￿ and their continued kidnapping and military actions in 1983
stalled the peace process. Additionally, after the process had begun, the
FARC submitted to the government new petitions and demands that could
not feasibly be met, such as the creation of new commissions, dates and
time frames, eventually dooming the process. Ram￿rez and Restrepo (1998)
compare the list of demands to a letter to Santa Claus and state that the
9 Casas (1980), p. 163.
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stalling tactics exercised by the FARC led to the loss of popular support
for the peace process10.
In 1984 the peace process led to the signing of the ￿La Uribe￿ accords,
and the FARC agreed to cease kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.
This important aspect of the agreement was not carried out, and popular
support for the peace effort continued to decline. It is worthwhile to note
also that these accords eventually led to the formation of the political arm
of the FARC, the Uni￿n Patri￿tica (Patriotic Union or UP). Unfortu-
nately, as Ram￿rez and Restrepo (1998) suggest, the duplicity of a political
movement as part of a group participating in armed fighting, kidnapping,
extortion and refusing to proceed with a cease-fire resulted in the UP be-
coming an easy target for anti-guerrilla interests.
La Rotta Mendoza (1996) suggests that the strategy to delay the peace
process revealed that the FARC, in particular, did not have a genuine
interest in reaching a lasting, comprehensive peace agreement with the
government and that the movement simply preferred to continue the
￿struggle￿ due to the appearance ￿other types￿ of interests. He identifies
the rejection of the Betancur peace effort as the most clear evidence that
the interests of the guerrilla movements were to raise revenue through
illicit activity, such as the participation in illegal drug production,
kidnapping, and extortion, and that they believed conflict more profitable
than peace. La Rotta Mendoza (1996) describes the proclaimed politi-
cal objective of the groups as an ￿illusion￿.
Even though a peace process was underway, the early-1980s also fre-
quently serve as a starting point for current discussions of the guerrilla move-
ments in Colombia that often frame the problem of these groups in the
context of ￿organized violence￿ or seek to redefine the movements as ille-
gal enterprises11. When explaining the movements, the emphasis has turned
toward their participation in diverse illegal activities and their strength from
10 The tactics and loss of popular support described by Ram￿rez and Restrepo (1998)
during the Betancur peace process are strikingly similar to the events observed during the
failed Pastrana peace process sixteen years later.
11 For the former, see Richani (1997), Pecaut (1997), and Ramirez Tobon (1990)and for the
latter see La Rotta Mendoza (1996) and Villamar￿n Pulido (1996).
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growing revenues. The revenues flow mainly from participation in drug cul-
tivation and production, kidnapping, and extortion. The movements also
earn income from their presence in departamentos with mining and agri-
cultural industries. The groups have been described as common delinquents
with economic strength, that have long since lost any ideals of justice and
equality in order to dedicate themselves to profitable enterprises (Serna
VÆzquez 1996) and as groups that are increasingly involved in criminal
activity and show an absolute loss of ethical boundaries in their criminal
behavior (Rangel Suarez 1996). The tie between the guerrilla and
narcotrafficking has led some observers to define the groups as
narcoguerrillas or narcoinsurgencies.
Pecaut (1997) points out the connection between the presence of the guerrilla
movements in regions known for drug production, mining and agriculture.
He states that the presence of the guerrilla is particularly correlated with
drug production in the departments of Caqueta, Guaviare, Vichada, Sucre,
C￿rdoba, Choc￿, Bolivar, Santander, and Norte de Santander (see Figure
1). Furthermore, it appears that the production of the most recently
introduced illicit drug, heroine, is most highly correlated with guerrilla
presence, suggesting that the guerrilla movements have successfully excluded
other groups from exercising control in the heroine industry. Pecaut (1997)
also states that the same correlation that exists between the presence of the
guerrilla movements and the zones of drug production can be found in the
mining sector and the industrialized agricultural sector, where the guerrilla
imposes a ￿production tax.￿ Consequently, the presence of the guerrilla
movements has been strongly associated with developed and industrialized
regions instead of those with largely peasant populations.
The effects of the military campaign and the changing social conditions on
the size of the three main guerrilla movements is shown in Table 8. The
groups begin small, experience a little growth in the mid-1960s, and then
slight decline in the early to mid-1970s. The FARC starts to grow again in
the late-1970s, the time of the affiliation with the emerging drug cartels, and
experiences a rapid increase in membership after the mid-1980s. The
fluctuations in the size of the ELN and EPL resemble the those of the FARC.
It also seems that the biggest jump in membership of all three movements
occurs after the groups became more involved in narcotrafficking and
stepped up activity in other illicit activities.
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Recent revenue estimates for the FARC and ELN reflect their bases of
operation12.Tables 4 through 7 show estimates of guerrilla revenues ac-
cording to various authors. In general, the FARC is more involved with the
narcotics industry than the ELN and it earns a larger portion of its revenues
from the production of illegal drugs, as seen in Tables 4 and 6. These num-
bers also show that the ELN tends to earn much of its revenue through
extortion. In Table 6, Richani (1997) defines the ￿war tax￿ as money col-
lected from multinational corporations, large land owners, and cattle ranch-
ers. A comparison of Tables 4 and 6 reveals the tremendous growth in
earnings for both guerrilla groups in the early 1990s. This can be attributed
in part to the increase in the production coca in Colombia as a result of
eradication programs implemented in Peru and Bolivia. Although all authors
recognize the revenue figures as rough estimates, they demonstrate that the
movements are solidly entrenched in a variety of illegal enterprises and they
earn large sums of money.
The growth in the number of fronts and revenues of the guerrilla movements
coincides with a general trend of increasing drug production and violence
in Colombia. Figure 2 and Table 9 demonstrate that the number of hectars
under drug cultivation and the value of illicit drug crops grew throughout
the 1980s and most of the 1990s. Accompanying the stronger guerrilla
movements and increased drug production are more homicides and
kidnappings. Figure 3 and Table 10 show that both homicides and
kidnappings have increased dramatically since the late-1970s. The rise in
homicides reflects the struggle for control of territory and the generally
violent nature of the illegal drug industry.
The period between the late-1970s and the present marks a strengthening
of the guerrilla movements through an increase in manpower and revenues,
an increase in the land under drug cultivation across Colombia, and an
increase in the number of homicides and kidnappings. The guerrilla
movements￿ continued participation in kidnappings and extortion and grow-
ing involvement in the cultivation and production of illicit drugs has also led
to the increasingly widespread belief that the movements are concerned
primarily with revenue raising activities.
12 No revenue estimates are available for the EPL.
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Conclusions
When discussing the situation which led to the formation of the early guer-
rilla movements in Colombia, Bagley (1988) returns to the conditions un-
der the Rojas Pinilla regime. The effects of partisan violence, the political
urgency of of socioeconomic change, and the reservoir of armed recruits
created the circumstances which sparked the formation of guerrilla groups
that attracted attention from the Soviet Union, Cuba and China. Although
the FARC and other early guerrilla groups may have participated in crimi-
nal activity for the purpose of economic enrichment prior to and from the
time of their formation, the groups￿ formalized structure and accompanying
political objectives of the early-1960s allowed them to be comfortably
classified as traditional guerrilla movements.
The more than 40 years since the formation of the original guerrilla move-
ments have witnessed an evolution their behavior. Two central factors con-
tributing to the shift in the objectives of the guerrilla movements are (1) that
the formation of the movements depended on recruits from criminal bandit
groups and (2) that government counter-insurgency programs resulted in
effective military actions against the organizations and the deaths of impor-
tant outspoken, ideological leaders, allowing criminal elements to have
greater influence over the behavior of the groups. Consequently, it seems
that the movements always faced a delicate balance between criminality
and ideological struggle, and with the military targeting of key leaders, the
loss of outside support, and the increase in potential illicit earnings through
the growth of the drug trade, the guerrilla groups chose to focus on illegal
entrepreneurial activity rather than revolutionary political objectives.
II. Related literature
A. Background
Although three main insurgent groups in Colombia, the FARC, ELN, and
EPL, are often referred to as guerrilla movements, the groups participate
in criminal activities such as the cultivation and processing of illicit drugs,
kidnapping and extortion. The perception that the interest of the move-
ments lies in monetary gain has led observers to question their political
objectives. When discussing the political motivation of guerrilla move-
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ments, Mao Tse-tung (1978) states ￿The essence of guerrilla warfare is
thus revolutionary in character￿.
The contrast under consideration is the motivation and conduct of tradi-
tional guerrilla movements whose goals and motives are based on those
outlined by Mao Tse-tung (1978) and other authors to movements whose
behavior more closely resembles that of illegal groups motivated by eco-
nomic gain. To be sure, Mao recognizes that elements of the guerrilla force
may participate in banditry and in the same way criminal groups may exer-
cise political influence. But the fundamental issue is the revolutionary na-
ture of the movement itself. The motives of the groups may be inferred
from the observed behavior and the markets in which the groups oper-
ate. Mao Tse-tung (1978) claims that within a revolutionary guerrilla
movement corruption should be eradicated and all actions must have a
￿clearly defined political goal￿. And he also states that ￿If the political
objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people￿, the politi-
cal goal can not be achieved13.
To consider the framework in which the Colombian guerrilla movements pres-
ently under review should be analyzed and in the effort to classify the groups
based on their observed behavior and the economic incentives driving that
behavior, several lines of related literature are presented. The literature on
guerrilla movements focuses on the behavior of groups whose objective is to
usurp political power. Section B briefly discusses the few existing articles in
the economics literature which analyze the behavior of guerrilla movements.
Section C. looks to the organized crime literature for previous papers
which define criminal behavior and address the problem of extortionary
relationships. Much of the organized crime literature works to define the
term ￿organized crime￿. The review below includes a lengthy discussion
of organized crime definitions offered by various authors in order to dem-
onstrate the disagreement that exists within the literature and to suggest
that, based on the Colombian guerrilla movements￿ observed behavior, it
is appropriate to classify or define them as criminal gangs, mafias or illicit
enterprises.
13 Mao Tse-tung (1978), p.40-42.
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The articles which focus specifically on the problem of extortion are dis-
cussed in Section D. As with the guerrilla literature, few papers are dedi-
cated to the topic.
B. Guerrilla movements
Two well known contemporary writers on guerrilla warfare are Mao Tse-
tung and Che Guevara. Both authors outline the nature of guerrilla warfare
and offer opinions on techniques that successful guerrilla movements should
employ. Mao Tse-tung (1978)states that the essence of guerrilla warfare is
revolutionary in character, and he speaks in general terms about the process
of organizing the people, achieving political unification, establishing bases
and equipping forces, and finally recovering lost territory. Guevara (1985)
also describes similar steps that an insurgent force should follow in order to
take control of the government, and he goes further and provides diagrams
of tank traps and Molotov cocktails.
The first models of guerrilla warfare in the early-1960s considered the
problem from a strategic, military perspective. Articles by  and Dolansky
(1964) in the journal Operations Research, a journal whose articles take
an engineering approach to military tactics, appear to be written to advise
military officials. For both authors, troop ratios and probabilities of successful
shootings are key factors in determining the outcome of conflicts, where
the objective of the guerrilla movement is to overthrow the government.
More recent articles which attempt to model guerrilla warfare, with the
objective of overthrowing the government, have been written by Hirshleifer￿s
(1988) and Brito and Intriligator. Hirshleifer￿s (1988) article analyzes a
problem that resembles the attack behavior observed along Colombian oil
pipelines. The objective of the approach is to demonstrate that in a general
equilibrium model, it is possible to obtain an equilibrium result where groups
engage in hostile interactions. He uses Cournot, Stackelberg, and Threat-
and-promise equilibriums to arrive at this conclusion. The two groups in
the problem choose the proportion of effort that they wish to allocate to
production or appropriation. His analysis confirms that conflict can occur
in an equilibrium, and he suggests the effect of conflict on the two groups
modeled. By starting with different resource allocations, he suggests that
the different solution techniques will affect the final distribution of income
and the preference for leading or following, and he establishes an important
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precedent in that income appropriation may be the principal motivation of
a hostile group.
Brito and Intriligator published three articles which analyze the structure
of guerrilla conflict, and relevant to their approach is the time of publica-
tion. The first ￿A Predator-Prey Model of Guerrilla Warfare￿ published
in 1988 and the second ￿An Economic Model of Guerrilla Warfare￿ pub-
lished in 1990 bring to the problem a Cold War era perspective. The
guerrilla movement is interpreted within the framework established by
the earlier Operations Research articles and the guerrilla movement￿s
objective is to overthrow the government, the implied purpose of which
would be to shift political alignment in a bipolar geopolitical framework.
The third article, ￿Narco-Traffic and Guerrilla Warfare￿ published in 1992,
suggests that movements now may need to seek support for the ongoing
political struggle through alternative means. Although they have introduced
the guerrilla group￿s involvement in drug trafficking and the deterioration
of the bipolar political framework, the paper proceeds with the belief
that the objective of the guerrilla is overthrowing the government or gar-
nering political strength.
In the first of the three articles, the foundation for their approach to guer-
rilla warfare, Intriligator and Brito (1988) introduce the problem of guer-
rilla warfare using a dynamic model, investigate the paths for the evolution
of guerrilla wars, and draw conclusions about how wars may be fought
over time. The underlying assumption about the movements is that their
objective is to convert members of the population into believers or fight-
ers for their cause and gain a critical majority of support in order to over-
throw the government. This structure evolved from the traditional portrayal
of guerrilla movements as outlined by Mao Tse-tung . The model com-
pares the evolution of the guerrilla movement to a predator-prey prob-
lem. The key for the movement is to have a stable (or increasing)
recruitment to loss ratio, so that their influence over the population is
constant or increases as they lose soldiers in battles against government
troops. The paper suggests that estimation of certain parameters could
indicate which side might win during a protracted guerrilla conflict. The
economic implication is in the guerrilla movement￿s decision to trade-off
resources under their control between fighting and indoctrination, and
the possibility that control over the economy may affect the recruitment
to loss ratio.
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The second of the three papers, Brito and Intriligator (1990), presents a
more developed model of guerrilla behavior, but focuses on the initial stages
of a guerrilla movement which has the traditional objective of overthrowing
the government. Initial conditions describing the characteristics of the country
will affect the path the guerrilla war follows. The path depends on the guer-
rilla￿s use of resources under their control; the ability of the movement to
obtain weapons (porosity of the country); the government￿s ability to raise
revenue through taxes to support the war as the guerrilla￿s strength in-
creases and land under it￿s control grows; and the mobility of the guerrilla
movement in order to carry out tactical missions and avoid government
retribution. The results suggest that guerrilla wars should be viewed in terms
of the guerrilla￿s ability to move from a defensive stage to a stalemate stage
in the conflict14.The guerrilla can either shift to a stable stalemate stage
independent of initial conditions or only if initial conditions are at some
critical trajectory will a stable or unstable second stage result. The article
does not address the transition from stalemate to overthrow of the govern-
ment, suggesting that a government collapse may occur as a result of pro-
longed fighting. The article leaves open many interesting issues about the
guerrilla￿s methods of obtaining resources in order to progress from one
stage to the next.
The set-up from the second paper supplies the framework for the third
paper, Brito and Intriligator (1992), and mentions, but does not explore,
the possibility that a guerrilla movement may exist without the objective
of overthrowing the government. The reason for avoiding this possibility
may be that such an objective would radically alter their interpretation of
the dynamics of the guerrilla-government interaction. But some of the
conclusions could still hold. For example, they believe that a key param-
eter in the model is porosity, the guerrilla movement￿s capacity to acquire
arms. Undoubtedly, the ability to acquire arms is a key parameter for
criminal groups as well, and for this reason it may be the case that guer-
rilla groups have a comparative advantage in the formation of criminal
gangs (e.g. IRA, the Colombian FARC and ELN guerrilla groups, and
guerrilla movements in Sierra Leone).
14 Brito and Intriligator (1990)  describe the guerrilla movement￿s armed struggle in terms of
stages. Stage one is offensive, stage two is stalemate, and stage three is overthrow of the
government.
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Their third paper, published after the collapse of the Soviet Union, intro-
duces the relationship between guerrilla groups and narcotraffickers. Now
the problem analyzed by Brito and Intriligator has three players and two
stages, where first the guerrilla movement fights the government, and then
in the second stage the druglords act as Stackelberg leaders with the gov-
ernment and guerrilla acting as Stackelberg followers. The claim is that the
druglords play a critical role in the outcome of the guerrilla movement￿s
war to overthrow the government by splitting resources between the insur-
gents and the government. The druglords manipulate the other two players
to drive the system to their preferred outcome, while the guerrilla and gov-
ernment remain locked in traditional guerrilla combat. The interaction be-
tween the druglords and the guerrilla movement resembles the relationship
between the guerrilla movement and a foreign nation offering covert aid.
Although an intriguing approach, it keeps the assumption that the guerrilla
movement has traditional objectives and does not consider how a change
in the objectives could alter results or behavior.
The few articles which discuss specifically guerrilla movements leave many
untouched issues. It is suggested that guerrilla movements may use re-
sources under their control to finance activity, but how the resources are
converted into currency or bartered for weaponry is not discussed. Also,
a change in the objectives of the guerrilla movement could significantly
alter previous conclusions.
C. Organized crime
The organized crime literature generally interprets organized crime as the
activity of mafias and their relationship with the state. The introduction by
Fiorentini and Peltzman, eds (1995) in their recent collection of articles on
the topic states ￿this is the first book to use economic theory in the analysis
of all the different aspects of organized crime: the origins, the internal or-
ganization, market behavior and deterrence policies.￿15 More than a testa-
ment to the comprehensiveness of the volume, the statement demonstrates
the paucity of literature that exists which defines and analyzes organized
crime and criminal or illicit entrepreneurial enterprises in general.
15 Fiorentini and Peltzman, eds (1995), p. 8.
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Fiorentini and Peltzman, eds (1995) introduce their collection by address-
ing the same problem of defining organized crime encountered nearly 20
years earlier in the 1967 President￿s Commission Task Force report on
organized crime (President￿s Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice 1967). They contrast previous applications of the
term to define a set of relations among illegal organizations and a group of
illegal activities performed by a given set of agents. Criminal organizations
can take the form of firms whose businesses produce illegal goods and
services for consumers, or instead behave like governments which try to
establish and enforce rules in the areas where they exercise control. In the
latter case, the control maybe over illegal activities, where illicit organiza-
tions cannot seek protection from the legitimate government16.
Articles in Fiorentini and Peltzman, eds (1995) consider two approaches
to identifying illegal markets in which organized crime groups operate. The
first type is illegal markets with no centralized control (no barriers to entry),
such as numbers, loan sharking, prostitution, smuggling, and counterfeiting.
There markets seem to be competitive, and not conducive to monopolistic
rents or the formation of over-reaching governmental-like structures. The
second type is illegal markets where criminal organizations tend to inte-
grate themselves vertically to reach some degree of central coordination,
such as money laundering, large scale distribution of narcotics, and the
supply of violence for extortionary purposes. Coordination generally oc-
curs through the establishment of (territorial) cartels and through the strength-
ening of vertical relationships.
Since criminal activity may be affected by conditions which lead to cen-
tralization or decentralization, in order to understand the problems faced
by the Colombian guerrilla movements it may be useful to outline factors
affecting the structure of criminal or illegal markets. Fiorentini and Peltzman,
eds (1995) list several conditions for each case. Forces leading to decen-
tralization may result from (1) risks involved in illegal transactions that de-
crease more than proportionally with their size since it is (nearly) impossible
to make contracts binding; (2) property rights over commodities that are
16 In the case of Colombia, government weakness or inability to protect the legitimate sector
may contribute to the widespread existence of criminal groups that seek to exercise
control over illegal and legal markets.
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not well defined and can be subject to seizure by enforcement agencies, so
that large investments in any given activity are discouraged; and (3) partici-
pants in illegal activities who run a risk of detection which grows with the
number of people involved because some members of the organization
may cooperate with investigative agencies (increasing monitoring costs).
On the other hand, centralization may occur due to (1) economies of scale
in some basic services needed to perform illegal activities; (2) exploitation
of monopolistic prices in some markets less open to external competition;
(3) internalization of negative externalities due to oversupply of violence;
(4) avoidance of resource dissipation through competitive lobbying and
corruption; (5) better management of a portfolio of risky activities; and (6)
easier access to national and international financial markets.
Despite the effort by Fiorentini and Peltzman, eds (1995) to identify features
of illegal markets which lead to the formation of organized crime groups and
offer a general framework and definition for analyzing organized crime, many
contributions in the volume begin with the author￿s own revised definition of
organized crime and do not couch the problem in terms of the framework
offered by Fiorentini and Peltzman, eds. Some definitions adopted are very
broad, as in the definition selected by Celentani and Martina (1995) , stating,
organized crime is ￿a set of agents (criminal firms) that have market power
and recognize the mutual influence of their activities and are therefore possi-
bly in a position to exploit some sort of cooperative behavior.￿ Anderson
(1995) suggests that a mafia is an organized crime group differentiated from
other groups engaged in violent or criminal activity by the ￿essential charac-
teristic￿ of ￿corruption or substantial influence in at least some agencies or
bureau of the legitimate government.￿ Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995)
define gangs as ￿long-lived organizations with primarily illegal activity￿, to be
distinguished from ￿short-lived groups of ordinary bandits and brigands￿.
Gangs are also said to have a near-monopoly in violence, long-life, organiza-
tion and territorial boundaries, essentially only differing from empires or modern
states because they lack a permanent bureaucracy. They elaborate further
that ￿gangs also develop organizational cultures and ideologies that contrib-
ute to their cohesion and expansion17￿.The variety of definitions reflects a
definitional problem which exists throughout the organized crime literature.
17 Celentani and Martina (1995), p. 254; Anderson (1995), p.35; Skaperdas and Syropoulos
(1995), p. 62.
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Smith, Jr. (1971) and Maltz (1976) made earlier attempts to clarify the
definition of organized crime, an effort motivated by the 1967 President￿s
Commission report Task Force Report: Organized Crime (President￿s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967).
Smith, Jr.￿s (1971) principal suggestion is to replace the term organized
crime with the term ￿illicit enterprise￿ in order to avoid a phrase which is
￿overburdened with stereotyped imagery￿. Smith, Jr. (1971)  proposes the
more general term enterprise for several reasons and contrasts his choice
with other possibilities. He states, ￿ ￿Enterprise￿ is preferable to activity
because the phenomena in question have objectives that are entrepreneurial
in nature. ￿Illicit￿ is preferable to criminal because... it establishes a less
pejorative base for analysis and because it can be distinguished in an
economic sense from ￿licit￿. The antonym of ￿criminal￿ is the legal alter-
native ￿civil￿18￿.With his alternative nomenclature, Smith, Jr. (1971)  pro-
ceeds to discuss characteristics of criminal activity in an effort to arrive at
a general framework.
Given the contrast between the terms ￿criminal￿ and ￿civil￿, the issue of law
enforcement and control of illicit enterprise arises. Smith, Jr. points out that
if illicit enterprise, including organized crime, is a natural outgrowth of an
economic structure, then the assumption that an attack on its purveyors will
eliminate its existence is questionable. For law enforcement to be effective,
a strategy may need to take into account the structural causes of crime.
This approach suggests observing the customers, suppliers, competitors
regulatory groups which are affiliated with the illicit activity.
Smith, Jr. (1971) also ponders the role of violence in illicit enterprise, which
is clearly an important aspect of the guerrilla movement￿s revenue raising
activities. He claims that violence may serve three principal functions for an
illicit enterprise: (1) maintenance of internal discipline, (2) enforcement of
market conditions, and (3) control of competition. Parallels can be drawn
between the role of violence in illicit enterprises and legitimate enterprises.
Violence as a means of enforcement and discipline may be a substitute for
legislative and judicial process (bank vs. loanshark); violence to control
market conditions may replace price wars; and finally violence to control
competition may be a substitute for buy-outs or take-overs.
18 Smith, Jr. (1971), p. 10.
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An important distinction is made between illicit enterprise and corruption.
It is claimed that corruption pertains to avoiding regular enforcement duties
or obtaining favorable resolution on government or judicial matters, activities
which an illicit enterprise or organized crime group may carry out.
Furthermore, Smith, Jr. (1971) notes that a distinction should be made
between corruption and graft that occur in a sustained, systematic manner
to facilitate organized crime and individual instances of payoffs related to
specific matter.
Maltz (1976) begins his discussion of the definitional problem by pointing
out that the lack of a clear and consistent definition stems from a semantic
problem. He states:
The word ￿crime￿ is usually taken to mean the aggregate of specific
￿crimes￿, i. e. crime is the specific behavior or act and crime is the
set of behaviors encompassing all crimes. In like manner we can
call an organized crime a specific behavior or act. Yet when we
talk of organized  crime in the generic sense we usually refer not
to a set of behaviors, but to an entity, a group of (unspecified)
people￿This confusion over the term leads to circular reasoning,
as in ￿organized crime runs the narcotics distribution in New York
City￿: the distribution of narcotics is an organized crime, and whoever
runs it is ipso facto ￿in organized crime19￿.
Maltz (1976) reasons that a definition of organized crime should clearly
identify a means and objective.
As other author￿s have done, Maltz (1976) offers a definition for organized
crime. He defines his categorization as a typology, and includes the means,
objective and manifestations of the action. Table 11 summarizes the defini-
tions and categories with examples. His broad definitions allows for major
differences in the organization of the criminal groups, the nature of the vic-
tims or participants, and the type of law enforcement response the activity
may solicit.
19 Maltz (1976), p. 16.
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Comparing Maltz￿s typology to the behavior of the Colombian guerrilla
movements, their actions lead them to be classified as organized crime
groups. The guerrilla movements perform illegal activities with an economic
objective. In the case of the Caæo Lim￿n-Coveæas oil pipeline, the con-
structor was threatened and extorted. It might also be noted that in Colom-
bia violence occurs in order to corrupt. For example, politicians or their
families may be threatened or kidnapped for carrying out reforms which
affect illegal guerrilla enterprises. The typology presents organized crime as
a broadly defined term, with specific categories that demonstrate that the guer-
rilla groups fulfill the criteria in order to be classified as organized crime groups.
Two articles by Schelling, Schelling (1967) and Schelling (1984), are com-
plementary, address the topic of organized crime, and offer a unique
characterization of the general aspects of organized crime and groups that
carry out extortion. The features of extortion he suggests can be applied to
the behavior of the guerrilla movements along Colombia￿s oil pipelines.
Often cited as one of the first articles to consider the economics of organized
crime, Schelling (1967) begins his discussion by stating the need to identify
the incentives and disincentives to organize crime, and how this in turn
could help evaluate costs and losses due to criminal enterprises, as well as
assist in law enforcement20.Schelling (1967)  divides criminal activity into
different categories with the purpose of addressing the question of why
some ￿underworld￿ businesses become organized while others do not, and
what kind of organization should be expected. His categorization of busi-
nesses or areas of operation includes black markets, racketeering, black
market monopoly, and cartel.
The category of crime identified as racketeering, defined as criminal mo-
nopoly and extortion, contains a lucid discussion of types of extortion.
Schelling (1967) states, ￿Extortion means living off somebody else￿s busi-
ness by the threat of violence21￿. The extortionist lives off of the host like a
parasite, while criminal monopoly is dedicated to the elimination of com-
petitors. He explains two types of extortion carried out by what he calls
20 This article was published prior to Becker￿s (1968) well-known article ￿Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach￿ which focuses less on organized crime and more
on the individual￿s decision to commit crime.
21 Schelling (1967), p. 163.
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organized crime. First, one means of extortion is to threaten to cut off the
supply of a monopolized commodity: labor on a construction site, trucking,
or some illegal commodity provided through the black market. Second,
extortion itself can be used to secure a monopoly privilege: instead of tak-
ing tribute in cash, a victim signs a contract for the high priced delivery of
beer or linen supplies. Schelling (1967) claims that organized extortion al-
ways needs an element of monopoly.
In his later essay, Schelling (1984) focuses more specifically on the
definitional problem of organized crime, using the 1967 President￿s
Commission Report as a starting point, and outlines detailed features of
extortionary relationships. He considers extortion an activity carried out by
organized crime groups, but first weighs in on the definitional issue.
Schelling (1984) distinguishes between criminals who commit crimes in an
organized manner ￿ well disciplined groups of burglars or bank robbers
￿ and those who seek to govern a criminal underworld. The definition he
suggests that fits most appropriately with the term organized crime is the
images of racketeers, who exercise exclusive influence or control (mo-
nopoly, as implied in Schelling (1967) His approach is to consider the char-
acteristics of illegal services or activities that show tendencies toward
monopolization, just as with some legitimate enterprises, in order to better
identify and understand the principles of organized crime.
The principal feature of organized crime that Schelling (1967) identifies is that it
exists in the lines of business that tend toward monopoly. He identifies extortion
as one of these areas, and suggests that it is a core business of organized crime.
Schelling (1967) says that extortion is amenable to monopoly because
large scale systematic extortion cannot really stand competition any
more than can a local taxing authority; I cannot take half of the
bookie￿s earnings if you took it before I got there￿ And if the
nominal basis for the extortion is the sale of a wire service or
something of the sort, then evidently there will be an apparent
monopoly of wire service in the underworld, but as a by-product of
the monopolization of the protection racket22.
22 Schelling (1984), p. 185.
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Schelling (1984) proceeds to enumerate the characteristics of easy targets
for organized extortion.
Five main features, or criteria, are outlined for easy targets of extortion
with short examples. (1) The victims should not be capable of protecting
themselves well, preferably with no access to protection from legal
authorities. (For this reason, victims of extortionists may participate in
illegal activity, for example the guerrilla￿s successful extortion or taxing of
those involved with the drug trade). (2) The extortionist wants a victim
that cannot hide from him. For example a burglar may be much more
difficult to locate than a bookmaker. If the bookmaker hides or is difficult
to find, he will likely lose clients. (3) The extortionist should have a means
of monitoring the victims activity and earnings. The extortionist must
observe in order to keep accounts straight. (4) It is easier to extort a
business that operates out of a fixed location. A business which does
not move will have a much more difficult time escaping the reaches of
the extortionist. (5) The extortion racket will probably be most
successful if the victim is treated fairly. This might imply uniform payments
across businesses in a protection racket and established rules in the
extortionary relationship.
Returning to the argument that the Colombian guerrilla movements can ac-
curately be characterized as criminal organizations, the specific example
of oil pipeline attacks is reconsidered in relation to the five points outlined
by Schelling (1984). By demonstrating a set of actions motivated by eco-
nomic gain, the claim of monetary rather than revolotionary political objec-
tives is forwarded. Here, a clear revolutionary alternative political alternative
exists: force the imperialist oil company to leave the country through con-
tinued, unrelenting attacks.
Considering each criterion individually demonstrates their accuracy and
applicability to the problem. The setting for the oil company in Colombia
allows (1) to be achieved in two ways. First, legal authorities are notori-
ously weak in enforcing order against the guerrilla movement. Second, the
multinational firms which have cooperative agreements with the national oil
company are prohibited by law from forming their own armies or armed
security forces to protect the pipeline. This stems in part from the possible
ramifications of deaths to Colombian citizens from shoot-outs with private
armies hired by non-national firms.
04 Guerrilla A.p65 07/06/2004, 16:14 125126 126 126 126 126
An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian
Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL
Norman Offstein
Criteria (2) and (4) hold due to the nature of the oil drilling business. In fact,
according to Schelling (1984), it would be the perfect candidate for
extortion. It is impossible to hide from the guerrilla movement because the
location of the oil field does not change. Once construction of the pipeline
is complete, the guerrilla always knows where to find it. The oil company
can not move, and is forced to interact with the guerrilla movement as long
as it exists in the territory of the pipeline.
The guerrilla￿s ability to monitor the oil company￿s revenues, criterion (3),
are probably imperfect. The means of monitoring revenues available to the
guerrilla might be the oil price on the world market and estimates of the
pumping capacity of the pipeline (that may or may not take into account
shifts in the rate of oil extraction). Although monitoring may be imprecise,
the guerrilla may perceive that the oil company￿s largesse indicates suffi-
cient means to meet extortion demands.
The final point mentioned by Schelling (1984), the fairness of the extortion
racket operated by the guerrilla, may be difficult to evaluate. For the oil
company, fairness may imply a constant percentage of revenues extorted,
or pipeline attacks only when payment demands are not met. But if the
guerrilla does not have precise monitoring capacity, fairness of the extor-
tion racket may be sacrificed. Also, there may exist tradeoffs between fair-
ness and the ability of the target of the extortion to hide or relocate the
business. Since the oil company can not move, the guerrilla may carry out
a less fair extortion regime with a smaller impact on revenues than extortion
of a more mobile enterprise.
In his earlier discussion about the characteristics of a market where crime
might become organized, Schelling (1967) proposes that operating costs
will affect size. He points out that the simplest explanation of a large-scale
firm in the underworld or anywhere else is high overhead costs or some
other element of technology that makes small-scale operation more costly
than large-scale. For example, the need to keep equipment of specialized
personnel fully utilized may explain in part the lower limit to the size of the
firm. Certainly some minimum investment exists in order to form a success-
ful guerrilla movement, and larger size probably helps in the procurement
of arms, observation and influence of local businesses, and the ability to
carry out threats of violence when necessary.
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Neither Schelling (1967) nor Schelling (1984) delve into the timing or de-
cision of violence carried out by the organized crime groups or the circum-
stances under which one should observe violence under an organized crime
regime. He recognizes that violence exists as an external cost, and that
organization of crime by the larger firm may produce less violence than
many smaller, less organized crime groups, but he does not attempt to
explain patterns of violence in organized crime.
Based on the above definitions offered by various authors, it appears that
the guerrilla movements in Colombia could alternatively be defined as
organized crime groups, mafias or gangs. The relationship between the
guerrilla movement and the oil company fits within the definitions of organized
crime, but classifying a group as ￿organized crime￿ does not explain the
nature of the group￿s activities. It may be useful to follow the typology
offered by Maltz and, as Fiorentini and Peltzman, eds (1995) suggest, con-
sider the markets in which the guerrilla operates. Does the guerrilla act like
a firm or a government-like organization, and what are its objectives? There
are many questions which remain to be answered in order to understand
the criminal nature of the Colombian guerrilla movements.
D. Extortion
As mentioned earlier, the literature which specifically addresses problems
of extortion is very small. The paper by Konrad and Skaperdas (1997)
deals primarily with the credibility problem of up-front investment faced by
the extortionist. Gangs have to make an up-front investment in order to
react to possible challenges from prospective victims. The investment may
include weapons, safehavens, and staff. They distinguish their approach to
the problem from the reputation literature by claiming that once the up-
front investment has been made by the gang, the variable costs of carrying
out the attack are zero. Konrad and Skaperdas identify an equilibrium
where the gang makes an investment and the shopkeepers pay the extor-
tion demanded.
Konrad and Skaperdas (1998) consider the problem faced by an
extortionary gang when the protection level of the police force varies. When
the shopkeeper pays, the gang does not attack the store. If the gang does
not recieve payment, there is a probability that the shop is attacked, where
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the probability depends on the level of gang and police effort. They find
that gangs form based on a relationship between the shopkeeper￿s level of
income and the amount of police effort and security of property. Property
security, a constant, intends to capture community norms where the shop-
keeper operates the business.
The suggestion by Konrad and Skaperdas (1998) that the variables police
effort, community norms and income size affect the formation of gangs and
extortionary relationships seems to fit for the case of Colombia. As dis-
cussed earlier, the guerrilla movements operate in regions where govern-
ment presence is weak and police effort is low. In the case of the oil
company, the tremendous value of the product, given the prior formation of
the guerrilla movements, would naturally attract extortionary demands.
Konrad and Skaperdas (1998) have also implicitly included Schelling￿s
(1984) criterion of fairness in their model. The gang does not attack the
shopkeeper if the extortion demand is met.
Conclusions
Although guerrilla movements, criminal groups and extortion are world-
wide phenomena, few papers in the econonmics literature have addressed
these topics. Previous papers defining the characteristics of guerrilla
movements assume that the ultimate objective of the movement is political
control, not economic gain. Deviation from what Mao Tse-tung (1978)
says, ￿hostilities must have a clearly defined policital goal￿ (i.e. expulsion of
the imperialists, change in political regime via coup d￿Øtah, etc.), allows
doubts to be rasied regarding the movements￿ motivation.
The organized crime literature addresses a variety of crime related topics
and raises interesting questions about the structure of markets in which
criminal groups form, but it remains divided on the proper definition of
organized crime. The review of existing definitions of organized crime serves
to demonstrate that the observed behavior of the Colombian guerrilla move-
ments and the markets in which they operate permits them to be classified
as a gangs, mafias, or organized crime groups.
This paper does not claim that political and criminal activities are mutually
exclusive, nor is it necessary to claim this in order to demonstrate the pri-
mary conclusion that the fundamental objectives of the movements have
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shifted away from those of traditional, revolutionary guerrillas in the purely
Maoist or Guevara sense. By drawing on the evidence presented, it be-
comes evident that economic interests and structural change have created
the circumstances leading to the shift in the movements￿ objectives.
In the case of the former, economic interest from earnings in narcorafficking,
extortion and kidnapping suggest a motivational shift in two forms. As
benefits from illicit activity grow (evidenced by the increasing revenues of
the movements), potential revolutionary influence increases, but less incentive
exists to overthrow the economic order, a shift that would delegitimize illegal,
illicit or criminal activity23.Taking of power requires a shift in the political
system, complete upheaval. A group whose benefits are large under the
present regime loses the incentive to create a political revolution, and in this
sense revolutionary objectives are not compatible with criminal.
As mentioned earlier, this incompatability presents itself in the case of the
oil pipeline attacks. A prolonged extortionary relationship with the oil com-
panies, instead of forcing them to leave the country through complete de-
struction of the pipelines, does not lead to the expulsion of the imperialists.
Regarding structural change, evidence suggests that the early ￿revolution-
ary guerrillas￿ did have a political agenda that was adapted by the nacent
guerrilla movements. But with the agricultural reforms and demographic
changes in the 1960s and 1970s, the rural base for supporting the move-
ments underwent structural change. The shift by the movements away from
the traditional base that represent support for radical political upheavel is
evidenced in the high correlation between guerrilla presence and devel-
oped and industrialized regions instead of primarily rural, agricultural regions.
23 Evidence of luxurious constructions by the FARC in the former Zona de distensi￿n
support the use of funds for pleasure rather than revolutionary objectives.
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Figure 1. Departamentos of Colombia.
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Table 1. Size of Colombian armed forces and defense spending, 1960-
1969.











a. Millions of 1946 Pesos.
Source: 1. Maullin (1973). 2. Alameda Ospina (1999).
Table 2. Changes in agricultural sector, 1965-1975.
Year GDP from Govt. Expend. Contrib. of Ratio of Ag. Stock of
Ag. Sectora,1 on Ag.c Labor to Ag. Labor to Physical
Output (%) Total Labor Capitalb
1965  62,167  1,113.9  34.3  41.3  4,616.6
1966  63,901  986.4  32.3  37.2  4,763.4
1967  68,430  1,114.7  32.6  40.4  4,903.9
1968  72,730  1,593.1  30.2  40.7  5,125.3
1969  75,308  2,052.7  31.3  36.1  5,462.3
1970  77,898  2,494.2  30.1  36.7  5,850.4
1971  78,529  2,987.0  29.7  37.3  6,246.7
1972  84,667  2,537.2  27.1  38.0  6,710.5
1973  86,669  2,381.6  23.9  33.4  7,186.9
1974  91,477  2,035.1  25.5  31.5  7,644.6
1975  96,766  2,705.6  23.8  26.8  8,065.7
a. Millions of 1975 Pesos.
b. Millions of 1958 Pesos.
c. Millions of 1960 Pesos.
Source: 1. Departamento Nacional de Planeaci￿n (1998); all others El￿as (1985).
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Table 3. Urban and rural population size.
Urban Rural
Year Sizea % of total Size
1938 2,879 30.9 6,438
1951 4,630 38.5 7,397
1964 9,328 52.1 8,576
1973 13,340 59.5 9,141
1982 17,500 64.9 9,465
a. in thousands.
Source: Hanratty and Meditz, eds (1990).














Table 5. Estimates of FARC revenues, 1991-1993 (millions of
dollars).
Activity 1991 1992 1993
Gold 10.8 12.7 13.3
Kidnappings 7.3 8.6 9.0
Petroleum industry 5.3 6.2 6.5
Drug taxes 39.9 46.7 48.8
Other 33.5 39.2 41.0
Total 96.8 113.4 118.6
Source: Villamar￿n Pulido (1996).
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Table 6. Estimates of FARC and ELN revenues, 1994 (millions of Dollars).
Activity FARC ELN
Kidnapping-ransom 72.6 72.6
Investments in Mining (gold and coal) 24.2 24.2
Extortion 16.9 98.0
Diversion of govt. funds 12.1 6.1
Investments in public transport 6.1
War tax 30.2 3.6
Tax on coca, poppy paste 169.4 50.8
Total 325.4 261.4
Source: Richani (1997).
Table 7. Estimates of 1994 revenues from petroleum extortion
(millions of dollars).
Guerrilla Group Official La Rotta Mendoza
FARC 13.0 65.2
ELN 18.6 93.2
Source: La Rotta Mendoza (1996).
Figure 2. Drug cultivation by crop, 1981-1998.
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Table 8. Size estimates of selected guerrilla groups.
ELN FARC EPL
Year
Armed men Fronts Armed men Fronts Armed men Fronts
1964  15; 161  11  200  -  -  -
1965  36  -  400  -  -  -
1966  38  -  580; 5002,a  - -  -
1967  90  -  600; 5002,a  - -  -
1968  95  -  650; 5002,a  -  80  -
1969  120  -  700  -  90  -
1970  150  -  740  -  100  -
1971  115  -  780  -  100  -
1972  95  -  790  -  90  -
1973  65  -  790  -  80  -
1974  38  -  800  -  60  -
1975  27  -  820  -  70  -
1976  34  -  820  -  80  -
1977  52  -  830  -  90  -
1978  60; 1901  3  850; 12001  7  100; 1001  4
1979  65  3  900  7  120  4
1980  70  3  980  11  140  2
1981  80  3  1200; 18001  11; 171  200; 3501  2
1982  100; 2301  4; 31  1300; 20001  15; 171  220  4
1983  150  5  1570; 24001  25  250  6
1984  350  4  1640; 30001  27  660  7
1985  700  7  2590; 35001  30  670  12
1986  1000; 18001  11; 111  3650; 40001  32  700; 14001  14
1987  1200  14  4280; 60002  39  750; 14001  15
1988  1700  16  4700  40  790; 14001  15
1989  2000  20  4750  45  1400  16
1990  2200; 26001  23  4800; 58001  46  1200; 12501  16
1991  2300; 27501 18003  25; 243  4900; 62001; 56003  49; 601; 493  190; 2003  7; 73
1992  2400; 28501; 20803  27; 253  5300; 58053  50; 503  200; 2103  7; 73
1993  2500; 30001; 24363  29; 293  5900; 63853  55; 553  250; 5503  10; 103
1994  2700; 31001; 27103  30; 323  6200; 68001; 69663  58; 603  300; 5501; 7153  12; 133
1995  3000; 25001  32  6400; 57001  60  350  13
1996  3300; 30003  32; 353  6500; 75003  62; 663  300; 7153  13; 123
1997  4000  33  6600  63  250  6
1998  4500  33  6700  63  200  4
a. 500 armed and several thousand peasant members.
1. Source: La Rotta Mendoza (1996).
2. Source: Hanrratty and Meditz, eds (1990).
3. Source: Richani (1997).
All others, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz.
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Table 10. Homicides and kidnappings in Colombia, 1964-1996.
Year Homicides Homicide Rate Kidnappings
1964 5,342 31 122
1965 5,728 32 84
1966 5,612 30 76
1967 5,607 29 76
1968 6,151 31 55
1969 3,908 19 50
1970 4,455 21 49
1971 4,885 23 63
1972 5,118 23 50
1973 5,175 23 49
1974 5,566 24 53
1975 5,788 24 73
1976 6,349 26 55
1977 7,014 28 71
1978 7,013 27 59
1979 7,749 33 44
1980 8,561 28 1,126
1981 10,798 36 1,014
1982 10,665 32 927
1983 9,800 32 876
1984 9,969 32 752
1985 12,922 40 821
1986 15,735 48 962
1987 17,447 52 1,554
1988 21,604 63 1,627
1989 22,772 65 2,186
1990 24,304 69 2,626
1991 28,280 78 2,080
1992 28,225 77 1,725
1993 28,048 75 1,999
1994 26,676 70 1,158
1995 25,318 65 1,608
1996 26,510 67 1,986
Source: Departamento Nacional de Planeaci￿n (1998).
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Figure 3. Homicides and kidnappings, 1964-1996.
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